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How Do We Get Them on the Farm?
Efforts to Improve Rural Teacher Recruitment and Retention in Arkansas
Robert Maranto
University of Arkansas

James V. Shuls
University of Arkansas
Rural schools, particularly high poverty rural schools, often have difficulty hiring and retaining qualified teachers.
Here, we discuss three programs the Arkansas Department of Education has used to attract teachers to teacher
Geographic Shortage Districts (GSDs) through material incentives. Unfortunately, none of the programs have had
much success, perhaps in part since the funding offered was inadequate to attract new teachers to isolated
communities. Additionally, we analyze the use of materialistic and non-materialistic incentives on the websites of
all school districts designated as GSDs by the Arkansas Department of Education. Few GSDs display nonmaterialistic appeals that might entice individuals to seek out employment in the district, with the notable exception
of KIPP Delta, the only charter school on the list, which has much more success recruiting teachers. We end with
suggestions for policymakers and school district officials seeking to attract teachers to geographic shortage areas.
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As Ingersoll (2003) points out, there is no overall
teacher shortage, but shortages do exist for some
geographic and subject areas. Math, science, and
special education are among the highest need subject
areas. Rural and inner city urban districts typically
suffer from geographic shortages (McClure &
Reeves, 2004). A highly effective teacher can
significantly improve student achievement (Chetty,
Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011; Hanushek, Kain,
O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2005; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain,
2005). In some schools, however, principals worry
about simply filling vacancies, not hiring the best
teachers. The inability of some rural and urban
schools to attract applicants leaves principals in the
precarious position of having to hire whoever walks
through the door, or failing to offer some courses.
As the baby boom generation prepares to retire,
particular market shortages for educators may get
worse. Fearing dramatic teacher shortages, both
national and state policy-makers have developed
programs to increase the number of teachers
(Ingersoll, 2002). Further, the numbers of nontraditional paths to teaching, for example, Troops to
Teachers, have grown, and indeed nearly a third of
new teachers nationally come from outside traditional
four-year education programs within colleges and
universities (Maranto & McShane, 2012).
Accordingly, states have provided easier pathways
for those who seek to change career to receive
alternative teacher certification. In addition, state
governments often offer incentives to teach in
shortage areas. Various states have offered loan
forgiveness, bonuses, housing allotments and various

other incentives for teaching in a high needs subject
area, geographic area, or low-income school
(McClure & Reeves, 2004).
In this article, we summarize the literature on
teacher retention and provide analysis of state and
local district efforts to recruit teachers to high needs
areas. We provide a descriptive overview of three
programs initiated with the intent to entice
individuals to high needs areas with materialistic
incentives. Next, we analyze the websites of the
Arkansas Geographic Shortage Districts (GSD) to
ascertain their use of materialistic and nonmaterialistic recruitment incentives in the recruitment
of teachers. We conclude with suggestions for policy
makers and school officials that might attract more
and better teachers to these hard to staff areas.
Monetary Incentives for Teacher Retention
Although widespread, monetary incentives have
not proved their ability to attract teachers. For
instance, the Massachusetts Signing Bonus Program,
which offered a signing bonus of $20,000 to attract
teachers had little impact in attracting new teachers
(Liu, Johnson, & Peske, 2004). Although it was
marketed as an upfront bonus for becoming a teacher,
in actuality the payout came in four installments.
After the first year the qualifying teachers received
$8,000; for the subsequent three years they received
$4,000. Liu, Johnson, and Peske (2004) interviewed
13 participants who indicated the accelerated track to
licensure was the biggest draw for them to enter the
program. Although the disbursements were designed

to keep teachers in the field for four years, only five
of the 13 teachers interviewed continued teaching
long enough to receive all of the bonus money.
Although Liu et al.’s study used a very small sample,
the fact that teachers were not attracted to remain in
teaching for the pay is consistent with other research.
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1999) indicated
individuals typically make the decision to teach based
on something other than salary. Ballou and
Podgursky (1997) suggest that simply raising teacher
salaries does not attract teachers and keep them in the
field.
As in Massachusetts, retaining teachers poses
challenges throughout the United States. Ingersoll
(2003) suggested the teacher shortage problem was
not due to lack of production of qualified teachers,
but rather reflected an inability to retain them. He
reported 40 to 50 percent of teachers leave the
profession within the first five years of teaching. In a
Texas study, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004)
reported almost 30 percent of teachers change
schools within their first three years. Not
surprisingly, turnover of teachers is connected to the
demographics of the students they teach, including
achievement level. Teachers often leave low-paying,
low-achieving schools in favor of employment in
high-paying, high achieving schools. Critics of
Teach for America (TFA) and other non-traditional
pathways into the profession often lament that
employment of graduates of such programs results in
high attrition. However, systematic research finds
that the low retention rate reflects the contexts of
schools where they teach. TFA, in particular, sends
new teachers to high poverty and typically low
performing schools. Statistical analyses indicate that
turnover of TFA corps members is high, but no
higher than for traditionally trained teachers placed at
the same schools (Grissom, 2008). High poverty
schools often suffer low teacher morale and high
teacher attrition no matter where their teachers come
from (Payne, 2008). California had results similar to
Massachusetts in its Governor’s Teaching
Fellowship, a $20,000 bonus for beginning teachers
in low-performing schools. The Governor’s
Teaching Fellowship increased the probability of a
novice teacher entering the workforce at a lowperforming school by 28%. However, teachers who
received the fellowship were no more likely to
remain in the field for four years than were nonrecipients (Steele, Murnane, & Willet, 2009).
While the $20,000 hiring incentives in
Massachusetts and California did not yield favorable
results in retaining teachers, North Carolina saw
some positive impacts by offering a bonus of only
$1,800 to teachers of math, science, and special
education in high poverty or low performing school

districts (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006).
Though the program was poorly implemented, it did
appear to slightly lower teacher attrition. One reason
for its small success may be that the North Carolina
incentive plan focused on all teachers rather than
only on new teachers, where most attrition occurs.
Existing Monetary Incentives in Arkansas
Arkansas is a relatively rural state which has had
considerable difficulty in attracting and retaining
teachers, particularly in high poverty rural areas. The
Arkansas Department of Education currently tries to
attract teachers to high need subject and geographic
shortage areas through three programs: High Priority
Bonus Incentives, Teacher Housing Development
Foundation, and the State Teacher Education
Program. These initiatives resulted from Lakeview v.
Huckabee (2002) ruling. In fact, the Arkansas
Teacher Housing Development Act specifically states
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruling as the reason for
developing the housing program (Ritter, 2009).
In 1992, the Lakeview School District sued the
state of Arkansas claiming the education funding
system was unconstitutional. Over the next decade, a
series of legislative initiatives and court cases ensued.
In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed that
school funding system in Arkansas was indeed
unconstitutional and required a legislative remedy.
The legislature responded by developing a new
funding formula and passing additional educationrelated legislation in a special legislative session. By
2007, after additional debate and litigation, the Court
ruled that the provision of education in state was
indeed adequate and thus finally in compliance with
the state’s constitution. As part of the response to the
lawsuit, lawmakers made these provisions to
incentivize new teachers into areas of the state that
have historically struggled to attract quality teachers
(Ritter, 2009).
High Priority Bonus Incentives
The Arkansas Education Code lists a high
priority district as a public school district with less
than 1,000 students where 80% or more of the
students are eligible for the National School Lunch
Act’s free or reduced-price lunches (Arkansas Code §
6-17-811). Teachers who are new to the profession
receive a one-time $5,000 bonus upon completion of
their first year of teaching in a high priority district.
Upon completion of both the second and third year in
the district teachers receive $4,000. For the next two
years of service with the district, teachers are eligible
for a $3,000 bonus. Each amount increased by
$1,000 in 2009. In 2007-08, 11 districts were

designated as high priority districts and 461 teachers
received a bonus (Arkansas Department of Education
[ADE], 2008). The total payout for the year was
$1,415,952, a mean of $3,071 per teacher in the
program.
Teacher Housing Development Foundation
In 2003, the Legislature passed the Arkansas
Teacher Housing Development Act. Under this act,
teachers in high priority districts are eligible for
housing assistance (Arkansas Education Code § 6-26101). This assistance can come in the form of a
conventional mortgage (interest rate not to exceed
6%), assistance with a second mortgage of less than
20% of the home’s value (interest rate not to exceed
4%), and down payment assistance in the form of
loan forgiveness of no more than 10% of the total
cost of the home, or rent reduction. The purchase
price of the home must be less than $100,000 and it
must be located within 30 miles of the high priority
district in which the teacher is employed. The
reduced rent price must be at least 50% of fair market
value.
To participate in the housing assistance program,
teachers must be high-performing and must teach in a
high priority district. A high priority district is one
that has difficulty recruiting teachers and has less

Table 1
STEP Shortage Areas
Licensure Areas

than 50% of students scoring proficient or advanced
on any of the Arkansas benchmark exams. A highperforming teacher must have taught for three years
at a district where 50% of students scored proficient
or advanced on all benchmark exams. A teacher can
qualify as high performing if he or she has taught at a
high priority district and has three letters of
recommendation.
State Teacher Education Program
In 2009, legislators consolidated the Minority
Teachers Scholars Program, Minority Masters
Fellows Program, and the State Teacher Assistance
Resource Program to form the State Teacher
Education Program (STEP) (Arkansas Code § 6-81131). STEP is a loan forgiveness program, created to
encourage teachers to teach in geographic and subject
shortage areas. STEP awards teachers $3,000 per
year for up to three years for teaching in a subject or
geographic shortage area as defined by the
Department of Higher Education and Department of
Education. Teachers who are classified as in a
minority qualify for an additional $1,000 for each of
the three years. The 2010 subject shortage areas are
listed in Table 1. In 2009-10, 188 schools in 54
districts were designated as geographic needs schools
(Arkansas Department of Higher Education, 2010)

Endorsements

Mathematics (Secondary, 7-12)

Library Media

Mathematics/Science (4-8)

School Counselor

English/Language Arts/Social Studies (4-8)

Gifted and Talented

Deaf Education

Algebra 1 Middle School

Visually Impaired

Middle School (5-8)
(Old Licenses: English (056), Math (111), Social
Studies (159), Science (139)

Speech Language Pathologist/Speech Therapist
Special Education Instructional Specialist or
(Old Licenses: {K-12} Mildly Handicapped,
Moderately/Profound Handicapped Severely
Emotionally Disturbed)
Life/Earth Science (7-12
Physical/Earth Science (7-12)
(Old Licenses: Biology/Chemistry/Physical
Science/Physics)
Spanish
French
Mandarin Chinese

To date, the success these programs have had in
attracting new teachers to hard-to-staff districts is not
evident. It may be the case that the monetary
incentives are simply not enough to attract teachers to
these areas, especially when higher salaries can be
earned in more desirable locations. Indeed, this may
be a problem with merit pay schemes as well, which
are often poorly understood and not trusted by
teachers, ephemeral, and typically have insufficient
rewards to change behavior (Payne, 2008; Ritter,
Maranto, & Buck, 2009). According to data provided
by the Arkansas Department of Higher Education, a
total of $1,586,000 was awarded to teachers in either
a subject or geographic shortage area, with a mean
payout of $3,128.21.

We estimate that $616,257 was awarded to
geographic shortage districts (GSD), while $932,207
went to teachers in non-geographic shortage districts
(non-GSD). In addition 12 awards were coded as
other, accounting for $37,539. Presumably, the
teachers in non-GSDs taught shortage subjects. One
hundred and ninety-seven STEP awards were given
to teachers in the 53 GSDs, while 298 teachers
received awards in the 192 other districts in the state.
This means that, despite having a much smaller
average student enrollment, GSDs were two to four
times more likely to have teachers receive a STEP
award than non-GSDs,. Table 2 shows the number of
STEP awards given to geographic shortage districts
compared to non-geographic shortage districts in
2010.

Table 2
Comparison of Geographic Shortage Districts (GSDs) with Non-Geographic Shortage Districts (non-GSDs)
Districts within Districts over
3 SD of Avg.
3SD of Avg.
State
GSDs
Non-GSDs
GSD
GSD
Average
(53)
192
enrollment
enrollment
(245)
(173)
(19)
2009 Base
Teacher Salary

$32,245

$33,984

$32,386

$35,839

$33,737

2009 Avg.
Teacher Salary

$43,842

$46,428

$43,020

$50,387

$46,056

Percent FRL

74

54

55

53

57

Percent Minority

46

31

19

44

33

2009 Avg.
Enrollment

1,253

2057

1,227

9,615

1,883

2010 Total STEP
Awards

197

298

187

111

495

2010 Avg.
STEP Awards
Per District

3.72

1. 55

1.08

5.84

2.

In Arkansas, a statute forces consolidation or
closure of districts with enrollments below 350. This
creates a positively skewed distribution of district
enrollment. As can be seen in Table 2 (data from
2010), GSDs have much smaller average student
enrollment than non-GSDs. To make a more
accurate comparison of districts, we removed from
Table 2, the outlier districts with extremely large
student populations, that is, three standard deviations
larger than the average GSD (19 in total). GSDs are
3.4 times more likely to have a STEP awarded to one
of their teachers than similarly-sized non- GSD
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districts. Teachers in GSDs are much more likely to
receive loan forgiveness from the state than are
teachers from similarly sized non GSDs . Notice,
however, the 19 non-GSDs with enrollment numbers
three standard deviations larger than the GSDs are
more likely to have more awards at the district level.
This can be explained by the number of teachers
working in each group; the large districts have
approximately 2.4 times as many teachers as the 53
GSDs. It is also likely the large districts possess
administrative resources to help teachers with
paperwork. By all accounts, it seems teachers in

GSDs are awarded loan forgiveness more frequently
than teachers in other districts; however, $347,231
was awarded to teachers in large non-GSDs. In light
of the fact that these teachers earn more money on
average (approximately $6,500 more) than those
employed in GSDs, such moneys may be more
effective if allocated to areas of greater need .
Whether or not the STEP monies are awarded
judiciously is beyond the scope of this article. A
more important issue is the influence the awards have
on recruiting and retaining teachers in high needs
regions of the state. This deserves further exploration
in additional research.
Website Recruitment
In addition to state-wide programs designed to
attract individuals to GSDs, we expect these districts
to also engage actively in recruiting teachers. While
we understand that websites are not the only way to
recruit teachers, they are the primary way an
individual from outside the area may become familiar
with a district prior to applying for a position. To
ascertain the Arkansas districts’ relative use of
materialistic and non-materialistic recruitment
incentives, we explored the websites of all of 53
districts labeled as a GSD by the Arkansas
Department of Education.
Arkansas is also home to two KIPP (Knowledge
is Power Program) non-profit charter schools. As part
of the 99 campus KIPP national network, the two
KIPP sites in Arkansas represent two of the three
rural KIPP locations nationally. (KIPP typically
locates in large cities.) KIPP Delta is listed as a
geographic shortage district by the Arkansas
Department of Education. Yet KIPP Delta campuses
typically have an average of 14 applicants for each
teaching position advertised, a number greater than
for the geographic shortage district vacancies. We
compared the contents of the 53 district GSD
websites to KIPP Delta.
Using a prior study comparing public school
websites nationally (Shuls & Maranto, forthcoming),
we identified two monetary incentives, salary and
benefits, along with six non-monetary incentives or
school characteristics that might be used to encourage
teachers to apply:
 opportunity to engage in public service
 freedom and autonomy in the classroom
 opportunities for advancement
 focus on professional growth
 collegial environment focused on teamwork
 results-driven organization
While not exhaustive, this is a representative list
of the material and non-material incentives that may

be used to attract teacher applicants. We used strict
selection criteria to determine if a website would be
coded as displaying each of the six types of
incentives.
Upon visiting the website of each district we
looked for the page that was used for teacher
recruitment. Often this page was indicated by the
words: Teach here, careers, or human resources.
From the main teacher recruitment page, we looked
for the criteria on teacher recruitment pages that
could be easily reached within two mouse clicks.
Some of the information we sought may have been
displayed on other parts of the website that we did
not explore; however, we were examining
information that was easily accessible to prospective
teachers from the main teacher recruitment webpage.
Below is a detailed explanation of the selection
criteria we used for each of the non-monetary and
monetary incentives. Three coders used a binary
coding system to code these incentives.
Selection Criteria
The eight website selection criteria used included
public service, freedom, advancement, professional
growth, teamwork, results-driven, salary and benefits.
Public service. A website was coded as
appealing to public service motives if it seemed to
appeal to a teacher's sense of duty. We included
websites that mentioned closing the achievement gap,
doing whatever it takes, and difficult or challenging
workloads.
Freedom. A website was coded as appealing to
a teacher’s sense of freedom if it offered teachers the
ability to innovate in the classroom. When specific
words were used for the type of applicants desired we
coded this as appealing to a sense of freedom. These
key words included: innovative, entrepreneurial, and
creative.
Advancement. A website was coded as
appealing to opportunities for advancement if it
described possibilities of rising to leadership roles.
Leadership roles were defined as anything from grade
level chairs, master teachers, and future principals or
school leaders.
Professional growth. A website was coded as
appealing to professional growth motives if it
mentioned opportunities to grow as a teacher. These
opportunities to grow included professional
development, mentoring, feedback from teachers or
principals.

Teamwork. A website was coded as appealing
to teamwork motives if it described the environment
as a team environment. We accepted phrases such as
‘join our team’ as fulfilling the teamwork criteria.
We also accepted collaboration and family as key
words for this construct.
Results driven. A website was coded as
appealing to results driven individuals if it described
the environment as being focused on results or
student achievement. We also accepted the following
key words as signals: data-driven and results-driven.
Salary. A website was coded as displaying
salary if it displayed a salary schedule or made
reference to pay.

Benefits. Websites that listed specific benefits
or alluded to benefits, including healthcare or
retirement, were coded as expressing this incentive.
We used this scheme to compare all 53 Arkansas
school districts that were listed as geographic
shortage districts in 2010 by the Arkansas
Department of Education (ADE, 2010).
Results
As a whole, the GSD district websites displayed
very little information relevant to recruiting new
teachers. The percentage of the 53 traditional public
school districts displaying the eight criteria is
presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Recruitment Incentives Displayed on GSD Websites
Percent of Websites Displaying
Construct
Info.
Salary
26%
Benefits
7%
Teamwork
4%
Professional Growth
0%
Public Service
0%
Innovate
0%
Results Driven
0%
Advancement
0%
Note: There were actually 54 GSD districts on the list in 2010, but since then the Twin Rivers School District has
been dissolved into two other districts and no longer exists.
The only district to consistently utilize its
website for the recruitment of teachers was the KIPP
Delta. The three coders agreed that KIPP Delta's
website was superior to other school websites in the
sample. It was appealing and eye catching. It
displayed pictures of students and provided useful
information to prospective teachers. Additionally, it
had information that appealed to both material and
non-material interests. The following is an excerpt
from the KIPP Delta careers page:
Whether you are interested in teaching in the
classroom or supporting our schools through the
central office, your work will directly impact the
lives of hundreds of children in the Delta. KIPP
Delta offers meaningful professional
development and ample opportunities to develop
your leadership skills. We encourage staff
members to wear multiple hats so that you can
develop relationships and grow in areas outside
of your main job role. If you are looking for a
place where you can grow as a professional and
truly make a difference, KIPP Delta may be a
perfect fit!

There was more information in this one
paragraph about teaching at KIPP than in the
combined total of all 53 GSD websites. If the GSDs
are in need of teachers, it is hard to tell from the
recruitment information on their websites. Of all 53
GSD districts, not one appealed to applicants' desire
for advancement, freedom, professional growth, or a
focus on results, and only two mentioned team and
one public service. Information about teaching jobs
was often hard to find. In fact, we were unable to
find any information at all regarding employment on
ten district websites. Of the 43 districts that did have
information about employment, most only had a job
application page. In comparison, KIPP Delta
appealed to every non-monetary construct except for
freedom.
On the surface, the GSDs did seem more likely
to appeal to monetary motives. Eleven districts’
salary schedules were easily accessible from their
main employment webpage. This finding, however,
does not tell the whole story. Arkansas requires all
traditional public school districts to display their
salary schedule somewhere on the webpage.
Undoubtedly, the salary schedules were displayed in

various other places on each of these websites, just
not on a job employment page. In short, the GSD
websites simply did not provide much useful
information to prospective teachers. GSD websites
seem woefully inadequate at appealing to nonmonetary or monetary incentives of prospective
teachers. Such failure to systematically provide
information specific to recruiting teachers typifies
even large districts that have trouble attracting
teachers (Hess, 2010).
While rural school districts in Arkansas typically
report difficulties in recruiting teachers, the two rural
Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) sites in the
state report having roughly 14 applicants for each
open position. This may be partly because they
provide a plethora of information for prospective
teachers on their websites. KIPP Delta is surrounded
by GSD’s. Generally, whether in Mississippi,
Arkansas, or Tennessee, the Mississippi Delta is one
of the most economically disadvantaged locations in
the United States and one of the hardest in which to
place quality teachers. Yet KIPP manages to attract
highly qualified applicants and has considerable
success in retaining them. KIPP Delta has been hailed
as one of the best schools in Arkansas (Maranto &
Shuls, 2011). Our estimates suggest KIPP Delta is in
the top 2% of Arkansas schools in regards to valueadded student achievement. Of the 11 AfricanAmerican students who passed the AP calculus exam
in the entire state of Arkansas in 2010, three were
KIPP Delta students.
Conclusion
In nearly every state, some schools are hard to
staff because of geographic teacher shortages. To
staff such schools, policy-makers often turn to
monetary incentives because they are controllable,
and indeed this explains part of the current push
toward merit pay (Ritter et al., 2009). Unfortunately,
particularly in the realm of education policy, the
impacts of material incentives at the school and
school district level are not always predictable
(Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009).
Some believe the way to attract teachers to high
needs areas is to pay teachers more money. Yet the
costs might be substantial. In northwest Arkansas,
which has grown rapidly in part because of the
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville and because of
Wal-Mart headquarters in Bentonville, teachers can
easily make $15,000 more than in a GSD. They can
also live in a growing and more urbanized
environment offering more cultural amenities and
social opportunities, albeit with much more traffic
and far higher housing costs. Generally, a $3,000 or
$4,000 incentive seems woefully insufficient to

attract the highest quality teachers to GSDs, given the
alternatives. If the incentive was increased to
$15,000 more teachers may apply, but what would
happen to teachers already teaching in the GSD?
Would the incentive also be available for them? If
so, such state funded pay raises would not be
politically sustainable. If not, these teachers might be
incentivized to move to another GSD nearby to
receive the incentive. Further, there is at least some
reason to think that emphasizing monetary incentives
could ultimately undermine the public service ethic
of the teaching profession, leading to less focus on
the long-term wellbeing of children (Maranto &
Maranto, 2006). In short, schools are about more
than just money, and the evidence presented suggests
that the monetary incentives employed by the
Arkansas Department of Education have been
insufficient and insufficiently targeted to significantly
assist GSD’s in teacher recruitment and retention.
Notably, rural school districts may face certain
distinct challenges compared to charter schools.
Freed from certain state regulations, charter schools
may have more ability to adjust to local conditions
(Wenger, Dinsmore, & Villagomez, 2012). KIPP, in
particular, is a network with a national reputation. In
contrast, few teachers have heard of the Piggot,
Dumas, or Marked Tree Public school districts, to
name but a few rural districts in Arkansas. A
national “brand” gives KIPP Delta a recruiting edge.
Moreover, traditional public schools are required to
hire certified teachers, an expectation that may
disproportionately hinder rural schools (Eppley,
2009). KIPP Delta can hire uncertified teachers,
though they must be highly qualified. Previous
research suggests that hiring uncertified teachers does
not necessarily harm student achievement (Maranto
& McShane, 2012). Yet KIPP has recruitment
disadvantages as well. KIPP teachers are required to
work longer hours and more days, with little more
pay. Some argue KIPP Delta teachers are held to
higher standards, making the job more demanding.
Furthermore, KIPP Delta teachers have at-will
contracts.
From the findings of this study, we make the
following recommendations for recruiting in rural
geographic shortage areas.
1.

Have a Place for Teacher Recruitment on the
District's Webpage

Improving the format and increasing recruitment
information on GSD websites may enhance the
recruitment of high quality teachers. Understandably,
small districts may lack the talent to develop a
sophisticated website. Often small rural schools have
students create and maintain the website as part of a

technology class. Even though these schools may not
have the ability to create an amazing website, they do
have the ability to type some text on a page. This
may be an area in which the SEA can offer important
support. If schools do not have the ability to create a
high quality webpage, the state could provide
assistance. Arkansas provided over 1.5 million
dollars in loan forgiveness for teachers in subject or
geographic shortage areas in 2010. One option may
be to divert $50,000 of these funds to provide
technological support to all geographic shortage
districts. After a one-time grant to upgrade the
websites, funding could be reduced to that needed for
periodic upgrades. Alternatively, the money could
provide professional development for a number of
years until the schools are able to take on web design
responsibilities themselves. It may not be true to say
of school web pages, "if you build it they will come,"
but certainly if a prospective teacher cannot find any

information on your web page they probably will not
apply.
2. Sell Your Schools to Potential Applicants
It is not enough to simply have an application or
the salary schedule posted on a webpage. School
districts should use their webpage to sell their school
to potential applicants. This should be a place to
highlight the unique things about a school. Time and
time again on the various KIPP web pages
information was presented to attract teachers. KIPP
serves disadvantaged students, and uses public
service appeals to attract teachers. Most GSDs in
Arkansas also serve disadvantaged students and they
could easily make such appeals. They could also
highlight small town environments, low housing
costs, outdoor recreation, scenery, or other potentially
attractive aspects of the school or community.
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